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PREMENSTRUAL STRESS SYNDROME AS A
DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL CASES
Premenstrual stress syndrome (PMS syndrome) is a disorder
afflicting many women.' The symptoms of PMS syndrome include
excessive thirst and appetite, bloating, headaches, anxiety, ,depression,
irritability, and general lethargy.2 Diagnosis depends on the timing of
the symptoms rather than on their type, number, or severity;3 not all
patients experience all possible symptoms. The symptoms develop and
increase in intensity from seven to fourteen days prior to the onset of
menses and disappear rapidly thereafter.4 PMS syndrome can range in
severity from mild to incapacitating, in both a physical and
psychological sense.5
Recently, in England, female defendants in separate criminal
actions successfully pleaded diminished responsibility or mitigating
circumstances by establishing that they suffered from PMS syndrome.6
It has been reported that France also recognizes PMS syndrome as a
form of legal insanity.7 The use of PMS syndrome as the basis for a
diminished capacity defense in England, and increased research and
awareness of the syndrome in the medical community, has sparked
debate in the United States legal community concerning the
1. Estimates of the precise percentage of women in the population who suffer from PMS
syndrome vary. The best current research, however, indicates that 70-90% of the female
population experience premenstrual symptoms while 20-40% experience some type of physical or
mental incapacity. Reid & Yen, Premenstrual Syndrome, 139 AM. J. OBSTET. AND GYNECOL. 85,
86 (1981). See also Pen, Mediacal, Psychiatric, andLegalAspects of Premenstrual Tension, 115 AM.
J. PSYCHOLOGY 211, 211-12 (1958).
2. Reid & Yen, supra note 1, at 86. PMS symptoms may also include craving for sweets,
back pain, breast tenderness, and constipation. Id
3. Id
4. The period during which premenstrual symptoms are present and the menstrual period
itself is often referred to as the paramenstruum. See d'Orban & Dalton, Violent Crime and the
Menstrual Cycle, 10 PSYCHOLoGIcAL MED. 353, 354 (1980).
5. Reid & Yen,,3upra notej, at 86.
6. Tybor, Women on Triak New DePense, 4 NATI LJ. 1, 16 (Feb. 15, 1982); Dalton, Cyclical
OimnlActsin PremenstrualSyndrome, LANcEr 1070, 1070 (Nov. 15, 1980) [hereinafter cited as
CKlcal Cnmnal Acts].
7. Oleck, Legal Aspects of Fremenstrual Tension, 166 INr'L REc. oF ME. 492, 496 (1953).
Oleck cites no authority for his statement that premenstrual tension falls within the category of
temporary insanity in France, Nevertheless researchers and writers in this area have accepted and
cited Oleck for the assertion that a temporary insanity defense based on PMS syndrome exists in
France. See, eg., d'Orban & Dalton, supra note 4, at 353 (citing Oleck); Tybor, supra note 6;
Henig, Dispelling Menstrul~fwts, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1982, § 6 (Magazine), at 79.
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admissibility of evidence to prove PMS syndrome.8
In an effort to resolve this debate, this note first discusses the
context in which a defendant in a criminal action might seek to use
expert testimony to establish that she suffered from PMS syndrome. 9
Second, the note discusses the two evidentiary standards used by courts
to evaluate a proffer of expert testimony on novel scientific evidence.10
Finally, the two standards are applied to evaluate the admissibility of
expert testimony proffered to establish that the defendant suffers from
PMS syndrome."'
I. DEFENSES BASED ON PMS SYNDROME
A defendant might seek to prove that she suffered from PMS syn-
drome either to establish a complete insanity defense or to establish a
defense of diminished capacity.' 2 No scientific evidence indicates that
PMS syndrome alone can produce psychosis;13 thus, there is little hope
that an insanity defense based on PMS syndrome would succeed.' 4
PMS syndrome may, however, provide a basis for a defense of
diminished capacity. The diminished capacity defense, if recognized
by a given jurisdiction, applies when a crime requires a specific state of
mind; to prove diminished capacity, the defendant must establish that
she was incapable of forming the specific state of mind. In contrast to a
successful insanity defense, however, the diminished capacity defense
does not completely exculpate the defendant; she is convicted, but for a
8. See Henig, supra note 7; Tybor, supra note 7.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 12-17.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 18-33.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 56-95.
12. Diminished capacity has also been referred to as partial responsibility, diminished re-
sponsibility, and even partial insanity, each term has essentially the same meaning. See W.
LAFAVE & A. ScOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 326 (1972). But see Arenella, The Dimin-
ished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 827 (1977) (Drawing distinction between diminished capacity and diminished
responsibility).
13. See infra note 75 and text accompanying notes 73-76.
14. As used herein psychosis is defined as:
profound, sweeping mental disorders characterized by partial or total loss of contact with,
or distortion of reality. Also characteristic are severe disturbances of perception, thought
processes, feelings and behavior, retreat from or perversion of social relationships, and
often a disintegration of personality structure, leading to the release of processes which
ordinarily operate only unconciously.
M. BLINDER, PSYCHIATRY IN THE EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF LAw, § 2.1 at 23 (2d ed. 1982) (empha-
sis in original). The term, therefore, is necessarily broad and encompasses many types of mental
disorders. In most cases, however, a person who is psychotic will exhibit a mental state sufficiently
impaired to satisfy any of the varying definitions of legal insanity.
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lesser offense.1 5
The classic use of the defense of diminished capacity is in murder
cases. To obtain a conviction for first degree murder, the prosecution
must establish that the defendant coolly and calmly planned the crime
before acting.' 6 A defendant relying on a diminished capacity defense
seeks to establish that she was incapable of such premeditation and
deliberation because of a mental defect. 'If the defendant successfully
establishes diminished capacity, she will be .convicted of the lesser of-
fense of second degree murder. t7
II. THE EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO THE USE OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY CONCERNING PMS SYNDROME
When the jury. must evaluate factual issues beyond its common
knowledge, the use of expert testimony is proper.'8 As a practical mat-
matter cases involving the PMS syndrome will require expert testimony
because the jury will probably not understand the defendant's testi-
mony, or may not attach the proper importance to that testimony.
Thus, whether the court will allow expert testimony to establish PMS
syndrome will in effect determine whether the defendant will have suf-
ficient opportunity to establish a diminished capacity defense.
To. obtain admission of expert testimony, the defendant must first
establish that PMS syndrome, the subject of the expert's testimony, is
15. Jurisdictions that have considered the issue have exhibited three approaches to dimin-
ished capacity: (1) recognition of a diminished capacity defense where the crime charged requires
a specific intent; (2) recognition of a diminished capacity defense .only where the crime charged
has multiple degrees requiring different states of mind (mens rea); and (3) rejection of the dimin-
ished capacity defense entirely, allowing only an "all or nothing" insanity defense. Note, Dimin-
ished Capacity-Receni Deciions and an Analytical Approach, 30 VAND. L. REV. 213, 214-28
(1977).
The Model Penal Code, although it abandons the specific/general intent dichotomy with
respect to crimes, adopts a diminished capacity defense. Section 4.02(1) states: "Evidence that the
defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove
that the defendant did or did not have a state of mind which is an element of an offense." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 4.02(1) (1962).
16. See, eg., State v. Bowser, 214 N.C. 249, 199 S.E. 31 (1938); CAL PENAL CODE § 189
(West Supp. 1982).
17. See, eg., People v. Goedecke, 65 Cal. 2d 850, 857, 423 P.2d 777, 781-82, 56 Cal. Rptr.
625, 629-30 (1967) (en bane) (reducing first degree murder conviction to second degree after find-
ing that the defendant's understanding of his act fell short of the mental state required for the
crime of first degree murder); Battalino v. People, 118 Colo. 587, 199 P.2d 897 (1948); see also
Comment, Deliberate Premeditation, Extreme Atrocity, and the Battered Child Syndrome-A New
Look at Ciminal C4pabillty in Massachusetts, 14 NEw ENG. L REV. 812 (1979); Comment, The
Doctine of D niuhed Capacity andthe Use ofMental Impairment to Reduce Degree of Conviction
in Maatmsez.ts, Commonwealth v. Gould, 3 W. NEW ENO. LJ. 583 (1981).
18. See Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827, 832 (D.C.), cert. denied 434 U.S. 973 (1977);
MCCORmICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 13, at 29-30 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as McCoRMICK]; Voorhis, Expert Opinion Evidence, 13 N.Y.L.F 651 (1968).
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beyond the knowledge of the average layman. The defendant must
also show that the expert is qualified to testify and offer an: opinion on
the subject in question.' 9 If the expert is to base his opinion on a novel
scientific principle or technique with which the court is unfamiliar,20
most courts impose a further requirement: the proponent of the novel
scientific evidence must establish that the theory or technique has
achieved "general acceptance" in its scientific field.2 '
Frye v. United States,22 a 1923 decision by the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, established the "general ac-
ceptance" standard. Because the Frye court did not explain or define
"general acceptance," or cite any precedent for its holding, courts ap-
plying the Frye standard have had to define "general acceptance."
These courts have also had to defend the Frye standard in the face of
increasing criticism from commentators.3 In response to this criticism,
19. See, eg., Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827, 832 (D.C.), cert. denied. 434 U.S. 973
(1977) (citing McCoRMicK, supra note 18, § 13, at 29-30).
20. Certain scientific techniques are so widely accepted by courts that their reliability isjudi-
cially noticed. Examples of such techniques include blood tests, ballistic tests, and fingerprinting
analysis. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 381, 391 A.2d 364, 367 (1978); see also Strong, Questions
Affecting the Admissibility of Scientf fc Evidence, U. ILL. L.F. 1, 6-7 n.15 (1970).
21. See, eg., Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 381, 391 A.2d 364, 367-68 (1978) (when the reliabil-
ity of a new procedure cannot be judicially noted, the reliability of the procedure must be estab-
lished, and the most widely used method of doing this is through a showing that a new technique
has been "generally accepted" in its scientific-field); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191,204-
05, 327 N.E.2d 671, 678-79 (1975) (admitting expert testimony based on use of voice spectography
to identify a defendant's voice after concluding that the technique had achieved "generally accept-
ability" in its field).
22. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The precise issue in Frye concerned the admissibility of
evidence produced by a crude precursor to the modem polygraph. Although the opinion is only
nine paragraphs long, it has become the landmark decision in the area. The actual language of
the court is as follows:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between experimental and
demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential
force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admit-
ting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery,
the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufflciently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particularfield in which it belongs.
Id at 1014 (emphasis added).
23. See, e.g., Giannelli, The Admissibility ofNovelScientife Evidence: Frye v. United States,
a Half-Century Later, 80 COLuM. L. REV. 1197, 1208-28 (1980); Strong, supra note 20, at 11-12.
The most common criticism of the Frye standard is that it unnecessarily excludes relevant scien-
tific evidence. This stems from Frye's insistence on general acceptance in an era in which scien-
tific advances occur at a staggering pace. As stated by one commentator.
[I]n light of today's rapid increase of scientific specialization and progress, such a test
presents one glaring problem: not only ire the courts unable to determine the accuracy
of the newest devices, but many of the experts themselves are unable to keep abreast of
all the developing techniques. Thus, unless the courts choose to ignore a potentially
useful source of information, a new system for determining the accuracy of these devel-
opments must be found.
Note, Evolving Methods of Scientfc Proof, 13 N.Y.LF. 677, 685 (1968); see also Boyce, Judicial
Recognition of Scienqftc Evidence in Crininal Cases, 8 UTAH L. REv. 313, 314 (1964).
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courts applying the Frye standard have advanced the following ratio-
nales in support of the test. First, the general acceptance standard en-
sures "that a minimal reserve of experts exist who can critically
examine the validity of a scientific determination in a particular
case."24  Second, the Frye test promotes uniformity of decisionmak-
ing.2 5 Third, the test eliminates time consuming hearings on the valid-
ity of new scientific techniques.26 The'primary rationale advanced in
support of Frye, however, is that it provides a means for ensuring the
reliability of novel scientific evidence.2 7Some courts refuse to follow Frye, and adopt instead the minority
approach associated with Professor McCormick, one of Frye's early
critics.28 Under McCormick's approach, once a party shows that the
24. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741,744 (D.C. Cir. 1974). TheAddison court applied
the "general acceptance" standard to voice spectography, a technique by which the identity of a
person whose voice is recorded on tape may be determined. In support of its application of the
Frye test, the Addison court stated:
"mhe Frye test protects prosecution and defense alike by assuring that a minimal reserve
of experts exist who can critically examine the validity of a scientific determination in a
particular case. Since scientific proof may in some instances assume a posture of mystic
infallibility in the eyes of a jury . . . the ability to produce rebuttal experts, equally
conversant with. . . a particular technique, may prove to be essential.
Id
25. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 31, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244-45, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148-49
(1976). The court in Kelly also addressed the issue of the admissibility of voice spectographic
analysis. In support of Frye, the court stated: "[A] beneficial consequence of the Frye test is that
it may well promote a degree of uniformity of decision. Individual judges whose particular con-
clusions may differ regarding the reliability of particular scientific evidence, may discover substan-
tial agreement and consensus in the scientific community." Id; see also Reed v. State, 238 Md.
374, 381, 391 A.2d 364, 367 (1978) ("the reliability of a scientific technique does not vary accord-
ing to the circumstances of-each case .... [Clonsiderations of uniformity and consistency of deci-
sion-making require that a legal standard or test be articulated").
26. Reed v. State, 283 Md. at 388, 391 A.2d at 371-72 (1978). The Reed court argued that
without the Frye test or its equivalent, a trial could degenerate into a protracted process of exami-
nation and cross-examination of experts concerning a new technique. Id ; accord State v. Cary, 99
NJ. Super. 323, 332, 239 A.2d 680, 684 (1968) ("It is not for the law to experiment but for science
to do so.").
27. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741,743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Strong, supra note 20, at
14; Note, Evidence-A dm.rsbility of Evidence-Frye Standard of "General.Acceptance"for Admls-
sibility of Scientific Evidence Rejected in Favor of Balancing Tw, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 875, 881
(1979).
Commentators disagree on whether Frye in fact ensures the reliability of novel scientific evi-
dence. Compare Giannelli, supra note 23, at 1207-31 (problems in applying Frye far outweigh the
reasons advanced for its use) wfth Note, supra, (Frye ensures the reliability of novel scientific
evidence).
28. McCormick states that:
"General scientific acceptance" is a proper condition for taking judicial notice of scien-
tific facts, but not a criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence. Any relevant
conclusions which are supported by a qualified expert witness should be received unless
there are other reasons for exclusion. Particularly, probative value may be overborne by
the familiar dangers of prejudicing or misleading the jury. . . . If the courts used this
approach, instead of repeating a supposed requirement of "general acceptance" not else-
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proffered expert testimony is relevant, a court will admit-the evidence
unless it would, for example, prejudice or mislead the jury.29 Any disa-
greement within the scientific community concerning the reliability of
the new technique or principle would go to the weight of the evidence,
and would not affect its admissibility.30
Because the Frye standard requires "general acceptance" before
novel scientific evidence may be admitted, it is a more conservative
evidentiary standard than the relevancy approach associated with Pro-
fessor McCormick.31 Therefore, although a court following Frye may
where imposed, they would arrive at a practical way of utilizing the results of scientific
advances.
MCCORMICK, supra note 18, § 203, at 491.
McCormick is, however, somewhat inconsistent. One commentator has pointed out that in
the paragraph directly preceding the above passage, the novelty or want of general acceptance of a
new scientific technique or principle is said to decrease the probative value of the evidence and
increase the chances of misleading the jury. This follows the basic relevancy approach, and "sug-
gests that novelty and want of general acceptance are integral parts of the relevancy analysis. In
short, the admissibility of the evidence, not just its weight, is affected by lack of general accept-
ance." Giannelli, supra note 23, at 1233-34.
29. The Federal Rules of Evidence apparently support the relevancy approach. The "general
acceptance" language of Frye cannot be found in any of the Rules. The only requirements for
admitting scientific evidence are found in Rules 702 and 403. Rule 702 states: "If scientific, tech-
nical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert... may testify thereto.... The only
significant limitation on this Rule is found in Rule 403, which excludes relevant evidence if its
"probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence."
Nevertheless, the federal circuit courts are split over whether the Federal Rules of Evidence
abandon the Frye standard. See United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1117 (1978); United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019
(1975) (Frye test has not survived the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence). Contra
United States v. Hendershat, 614 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Brody, 595 F.2d 359
(6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 862 (1980); United States v. McDaniel, 538 F.2d 408 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (continuing to follow the Frye standard). Commentators also disagree as to whether the
Federal Rules of Evidence abandon Frye. Compare Gianelli, supra note 23, at 1229 (presenting
the argument that the Federal Rules have not abandoned Frye) with J. WISTE & M. BERGER,
3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 702[03], at 702-16 (1981) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN]. The latter
states: "Rule 702's failure to incorporate a general scientific acceptance standard, and the Advi-
sory Committee Notes failure to even mention the Frye case... should be regarded as tanta-
mount to an abandonment of the general acceptance standard."
30. See United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463,466 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975)
('lilt is better to admit relevant scientific evidence in the same manner as other expert testimony
and allow its weight to be attacked by cross-examination and refutation"); see also United States
v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1200 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
31. Weinstein has captured the different philosophies exhibited by these two standards: "In-
stead of assuming inadmissibility unless the independently controlling standard of Frye is satis-
fied, the relevance approach favors admissibiity whenever the general conditions for the
admissibility of evidence have been met." 3 WEINSTEIN, supra note 29, 702[03], at 702-21.
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admit expert testimony concerning PMS syndrome, 32 the defendant
will be more likely to have such testimony admitted in a jurisdiction
that follows Professor McCormick's approach. 33
III. THE FRYE STANDARD
A. Determining Wether Frye Applies.
It is not clear that courts following Frye will choose to apply the
"general acceptance" standard to expert testimony on PMS syndrome.
Courts have applied Frye primarily to expert testimony regarding evi-
dence obtained through the use of a mechanical device or instrument.34
Examples include polygraphs,35 voice spectrographs,36 neutron activa-
tion analyses, 37 and gunshot residue analyses by scanning electron mi-
croscopes.38 In contrast, courts have not subjected expert testimony
based on psychiatric or psychological science to the rigors of the "gen-
eral acceptance" standard. One commentator noted this difference in
approach and could offer only this explanation:
[Tihis form of evidence-which purports to be scientific, although
admittedly more "social" in background-has been more readily and
easily accepted by courts than the more objective "physical" evi-
dence from scientific devices. The rule of the Frye case has not been
applied to this field, apparently because the evidence in opinion form
is not tantamount to being the result of a device or mechanical
Some courts have considered the conservative nature of the Frye standard one of its most
worthwhile features. See People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24,31-32,549 P.2d 1240, 1245, 130 Cal. Rptr.
144, 149 (1976); see also United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
32. See l 3ra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
34. See State exrel Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 198-99, 644 P.2d 1266, 1283-85
(1982) (original and supplemental opinion) (applying Frye to the issue of the admissibility of
testimony from a witness whose memory was hypnotically refreshed, after noting that hypnosis,
unlike-other scientific techniques to which Frye has been applied, does not involve data obtained
from physical tests); State v. Hurd, 86 NJ. 525, 536, 432 A.2d 86, 91 (1981) (noting that the Frye
standard has usually been applied to results of "physical tests such as radar.").
35. See United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 163-64 (8th Cir. 1975) (rejecting polygraph
evidence); People v. Anderson, 637 P.2d 354, 358-59 (Colo. 1981) (rejecting polygraph evidence).
36. See People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976) (rejecting
voiceprint analysis); Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978) (rejecting voiceprint analy-
sis); People v. Tobey, 401 Mich. 141, 145-48, 257 N.W.2d 537, 538-40 (1970) (rejecting voiceprint
analysis).
37. See United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 554-58 (6th Cir. 1977) (rejecting neutron acti-
vation analysis of hair samples after applying variant of Frye test that equates general acceptance
with reliability); United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431,438-41 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
994 (1971) (admitting evidence based on neutron activation analysis after finding the technique
was generally accepted).
38. See People v. Palmer, 80 Cal. App. 3d 239,250-55, 145 Cal. Rptr. 466,471-74 (1978) (use
of a scanning electron microscope to identify particles is generally accepted).
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instrument. 39
Frye, however, has recently been applied to novel scientific evi-
dence not involving the measurement of physical data. Courts have
evaluated the admissibility of expert testimony on battered wife syn-
drome (BWS) by applying the Frye "general acceptance" standard.40
As with PMS syndrome, the proffer of BWS evidence confronts a court
with novel scientific evidence that does not involve the use of mechani-
cal aids. BWS has been identified through studies of women who have
been repeatedly beaten by their husbands or boyfriends. These studies
attempt to explain the psychopathology of the battering relationship
and the seemingly irrational response of women in these relation-
ships.4' The expert decides whether a particular individual suffers
from BWS by evaluating the woman's history of battering in light of
what past studies have identified as instances of BWS.42
Many courts, in deciding whether or not to allow testimony con-
cerning BWS, have applied what is in effect the "general acceptance"
standard of Frye. Although these decisions have not reached uniform
results, the primary disagreement between courts is whether "the study
of the battered woman syndrome is an area sufficiently developed to
permit an expert to assert a reasonable opinion."43
39. Boyce, Judicial Recognition of ScientfFc Evidence in Criminal Cases, 8 UTAH L. REV. 313,
324 (1962-1964). A more recent commentator has suggested that the Frye standard ought to be
applied to psychological or psychiatric testimony by experts. According to this commentator,
courts have focused on the qualifications of the particular expert witness rather than the underly-
ing reliability of the scientific principles on which the expert bases his opinions, thus judicially
noticing the reliability of psychological or psychiatric testimony by experts. Comment, The Psy-
chologist as Expert Witness: Science in the Courtroom, 38 MD. L. REv. 539 (1979).
40. A defendant usually seeks to introduce expert testimony on battered wife syndrome
(BWS) as part of a claim of self defense to a murder or assault charge. The defendant introduces
evidence of BWS to show that she was a battered woman, that she did not end her marriage or
relationship because she suffered from a condition known as "learned helplessness," and that she
reasonably feared that she was about to be killed or suffer great bodily harm when she either
killed or assaulted her husband or boyfriend. See, eg., Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626
(D.C. 1979); Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801, 805-06 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); State v.
Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981); L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 42-54
(1979); see also Note, Partially Determined Impe fect Self-Defens: The Battered Wife Kills and
Tells ffy, 34 STAN. L. REv. 615 (1982). But see State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 424 A.2d 171
(1980) (state offered evidence that the defendant's wife had suffered from BWS to rebut the de-
fendant's insanity defense to the charge of attempted murder of his wife).
41. See L. WALKER, supra note 40, at 42-54. Dr. Walker, a clinical psychologist, is the pre-
eminent expert in this field and is often called to testify for a defendant who claims to suffer from
BWS. See, eg., Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
42. See Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 634, 637 (D.C. 1979) (appellate court
applying a variant of Frye found that the trial court erred in refusing psychologist's testimony on
BWS).
43. Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801, 805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (citing Dyas v. United
States, 376 A.2d 827, 832 (D.C.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 973 (1977)).
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For example, in Ohio v. Thomas" the Ohio Supreme Court re-
jected expert testimony on BWS, stating that "'Battered Wife Syn-
drome" is not sufficiently developed, as a matter of commonly accepted
scientific knowledge to warrant testimony under the guise of exper-
tise,"45 and that "no general acceptance of the expert's particular meth-
odology has been established." 46  Likewise, in Buhrle v. State47 the
Wyoming Supreme Court held expert testimony on BWS inadmissible,
emphasizing that the "acceptance or recognition of the phenomenon is
largely limited to people who are actively engaged in the research [of
BWS].''48 In other words, in the court's opinion, BWS had not attained
a sufficient degree of acceptance in the scientific community to warrant
the admission of expert testimony. In Ibn-Tamas v. United States, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, however, when faced
with expert testimony nearly identical to that in Thomas and Buhrle,
applied a version of Frye's "general acceptance" standard and con-
cluded that the trial court had erred in excluding expert testimony on
BWS.49
Cases involving BWS are only one example of courts applying the
"general acceptance" standard to novel scientific evidence not involv-
ing mechanical aids or devices. Courts have also applied the "general
acceptance" standard when a party has proffered testimony of a witness
whose memory has been refreshed through hypnosis, 50 when a defend-
44. 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981).
45. Id at 522, 423 N.E.2d at 140.
46. Id at 521, 423 N.E.2d at 140.
47. 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1981).
48. Id at 1377. Some courts have concluded that Fre's "general acceptance" standard is
satisfied even if "general acceptance" exists only among those actively engaged in researching or
studying the new technique or principle. See Infra note 59.
49. 407 A.2d 626, 638 (D.C. 1979). Although Ibn.Tamas cites Frye and applies it to the
inquiry of whether an expert can assert a reasonable opinion, it does so in a manner inconsistent
with prior case law. The court states that in applying the "general Acceptance" standard the rele-
vant inquiry is whether the expert's "methodology for identifying and studying women has
[gained] general acceptance-not whether there is, in addition, a general acceptance of the bat-
tered woman concept derived from that methodology." Id This application of Frye is incorrect.
Fre is not directed at whether a scientist has followed generally accepted practices in his re-
search. If this were true, phrenologists and astrologers could persuasively argue that their testi-
mony based on their work is admissible. All they would need to show is that they followed
properly controlled research procedures in reaching their conclusions.
Other courts have accepted expert testimony on BWS without mention of the general accept-
ance standard. See, eg., Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612,277 S.E.2d 678 (1981); Maine v. Anaya, 438
A.2d 892 (Me. 1981).
50. See State ex reL Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982) (noting
that Frye had been applied in most cases to data obtained through physical tests); State v. Mack,
292 N.W.2d 764,769 (Minn. 1980) (specifically rejecting argument that Frye does not apply where
proffered evidence does not consist of results from a mechanical device); State v. Hurd, 86 NJ.
525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981).
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ant has sought to introduce expert testimony on the unrieliability of eye
witnesses,5I when the defendant has tried to introduce expert testimony
on psycholinguistics, 5 2 and when the prosecution has tried to introduce
expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome to negate a defendant's ar-
gument that a rape victim had consented to sexual intercourse with
him. 3 These cases indicate that a mere lack of "hard" physical data
does not prevent a court from applying the Frye test to novel scientific
evidence such as PMS syndrome.
Applying the Frye standard to PMS cases is logically sound. The
standard provides the court with a convenient framework for evaluat-
ing a proffer of expert testimony on PMS syndrome. More impor-
tantly, the requirement of general acceptance ensures the reliability of
novel scientific evidence such as evidence of PMS syndrome.54 Thus,
the Frye test is well suited to the issue of whether a court should admit
expert testimony on PMS syndrome.
B. Applying the Frye Standard to Cases Involving PMS Syndrome.
Once a court decides to use the Frye test to evaluate a proffer of
expert testimony on PMS syndrome, it must apply the Frye standard."
The court must first define the relevant scientific community. Second,
it must define the concept or theory that the community is to accept or
reject. Finally,. the court must determine whether the community ac-
51. See United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (Ist Cir. 1979) (citing Frye as one standard
for evaluating reliability but also citing more flexible "relevancy" approach and applying balanc-
ing approach of Federal Rules of Evidence).
52. See United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 893, 895 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (affirming trial court
decision to exclude expert testimony based on psycholinguistics that would have indicated that
defendant's writings or utterances were authored by someone else and stating: "It is not incon-
ceivable that in the near future the science of psycholinguistics will have achieved such general
acceptance among psychological and scientific authorities as to justify courts of law in admitting
expert testimony on this subject.").
53. See State v. Marks, 31 CuM. L. REP. (BNA) 2388 (July 16, 1982) (applying Frye test in
choosing to admit testimony on rape trauma syndrome even though use of general acceptance
standard in Kansas had previously been applied only to physical scientific evidence).
54. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
55. In applying Frye, courts have often reached different results when presented with similar,
if not identical, scientific evidence. This has occurred, in large measure, because the Frye court
failed to explain the standard "general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."
Frye, 293 F. at 1014. The Frye court also failed to cite any precedent for its holding. Thus, the
task of putting flesh on the bones of the Frye court's language has fallen upon courts that have
since adopted the standard. Lack of uniformity is predictable in such circumstances. The conflict-
ing results reached by courts regarding the admissibility of expert testimony on voice
spectography is a striking example of this lack of uniformity. Some courts have admitted, while
others have excluded, expert testimony based on the technique. See infra note 59.
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cepts or rejects the concept or theory.56
Defining the relevant scientific community is not always an easy
task. Many new scientific principles fall into more than one scientific
field,57 thereby making it difficult to assign a new principle or theory to
a particular discipline. PMS syndrome is no exception. Although it
falls within the general field of medical science it encompasses many
specialities within medicine. For example, psychiatry, gynecology, en-
docrinology, and neurology are all fields of study that, to one extent or
another, have a role to play in the study of PMS syndrome.53
In choosing a particular scientific field a court has wide latitude.
Generally, the more broadly a court defines the relevant scientific com-
munity, the more difficult it is to gain admission of the expert testimony
based on the novel scientific principle.59 Thus, if a court chooses the
56. See, eg., State ex re. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982);
Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 202-03, 327 N.E.2d 671, 677-78 (1975); see also Gian-
nelli, supra note 23, at 1208-19.
57. Voice spectography, for example, involves the scientific disciplines of anatomy, physics,
psychology, and linguistics. People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 456, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478, 490
(1968).
The inability to pigeonhole certain scientific principles often leads to their exclusion under
Frye because it is difficult to establish the qualifications of an expert witness. However, with the
passage of time and the increasing number of experts familiar with a particular technique or
principle, Frye can be satisfied. As noted by one commentator "The critical factor seems to be
whether some scientific profession-although not the one to which the principle is indigenous-
has put the principle to some use of its own, thus affording a thorough empirical testing of the
principle." Strong, supra note 20, at 12.
58. See generally various studies cited in Reid & Yen, supra note 1.
59. The Nalline test, which is used to detect the presence of narcotics in an individual's
bloodstream, and voice spectography, which is used to match recordings of a defendant's voice for
identification purposes, provide examples of the critical role played by the definition of the rele-
vant scientific community in a court's decision to either admit or exclude novel scientific evidence.
In People v. Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 858, 331 P.2d 251 (App. Deft Super. Ct. 1958), the
issue was whether to admit expert testimony based on the newly developed Nalline test. Had the
court applied the Frye test literally, general acceptance could not have been shown. The propo-
nent of the evidence, the prosecution, conceded that the general medical profession would be
unfamiliar with the test. The court, however, chose a narrow subspecialty of the medical profes-
sion as the relevant scientific community. The court required general acceptance of the test by
"those who would be expected to be familiar with its use," stating that "[i]n this age of specializa-
tion more should not be required." Id at 862, 331 P.2d at 254.
Courts presented with expert testimony based on voice spectrography have not always de-
fined the relevant scientific community similarly. The result has been the admission of such testi-
mony in some jurisdictions and its exclusion in others. In People v. Rogers, 86 Misc. 2d 868, 385
N.Y.S.2d 228 (Sup. Ct. 1976), for example, the court admitted testimony based on voice
spectography by, in effect, limiting the relevant scientific community to a single researcher in the
field. In admitting the expert testimony, the court found that the results obtained by this single
researcher adequately vouched for the reliability of voice spectography. Id at 874-82, 385
N.Y.S.2d at 233-37; see also Hodo v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 778, 785-89, 106 Cal. Rptr.
547, 551-53 (1973) (relying primarily on testimony of a single expert in concluding that voice
spectography is generally accepted) Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 205, 327 N.E.2d
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general area of medicine as the relevant community, it is unlikely that
it will find that PMS syndrome is generally accepted. Few physicians
can speak authoritatively about PMS syndrome because it has only re-
cently been identified and studied with any regularity.6°
There is precedent, however, for confining the relevant scientific
community to those researchers and clinicians who have studied PMS
syndrome and who are familiar with the current scientific literature on
PMS syndrome.6' The pitfall of this approach is that it may narrow the
field so much that the court cannot obtain an unbiased opinion, thereby
undermining the overriding rationale of Frye-assurance of the relia-
bility of novel scientific evidence. 62 There is, however, an increasing
number of physicians, clinical psychologists, and other interested scien-
tists who, either in person or through their published writings, could
671,678 (1975) (admitting testimony based on voice spectography after quoting with approval the
Wlliamr language stating that general acceptance should only be required from those expected to
be familiar with the use of a new technique).
Other courts, that have not so narrowly defined the relevant scientific community, have re-
jected evidence based on voice spectography. The court in People v. Tobey, 401 Mich. 141, 257
N.W.2d 537 (1977), held that voice spectography had not gained general acceptance in the scien-
tific community. Central to the court's holding was its position that "general scientific recognition
may not be established without the testimony of 'disinterested and impartial experts,' 'disinter-
ested scientists whose livelihood was not intimately connected with' the new technique." Id at
145, 257 N.W.2d at 539 (citations omitted). In People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130
Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976), the court rejected evidence based on voice spectography after pointing out
that the prosecution's expert on voice spectography admitted that general acceptance of the tech-
nique was restricted to "those persons... actually involved in voiceprint work. . . primarily [as]
voiceprint examiners ... :' Id at 37, 549 P.2d at 1248, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 152. These divergent
results highlight how critical the definition of the scientific community is in deciding whether
novel scientific evidence satisfies the Frye standard for admissibility.
These results, however, may only reflect a result-oriented jurisprudence. Those courts wish-
ing to admit a certain type of novel scientific evidence will be satisfied to rely on the statements of
a few well placed experts who will attest to the reliability of the evidence. In this regard, one
commentator notes: "Instead of using Frye as an analytical tool to decide whether novel scientific
evidence should be admitted, it appears that many courts apply it as a label to justify their own
views about the reliability of particular forensic techniques." Giannelli, supra note 23, at 1221;see
also Kom, Law, Fact andScience in the Courts, 66 COLUM. L. REv., 1080, 1098 (1966) (the "law's
reference to science" merely creates a "veneer of scientific determinism to decisions that really
turn on policy considerations to which the scientific referent bears little relation.").
60. Commentators and courts often criticize the Frye test for barring the admission of new
scientific evidence. Extremely novel techniques can rarely satisfy the general acceptance standard
once the relevant scientific community is defined beyond those intimately connected with research
concerning the new principle or technique. See supra note 23.
61. See, e-g., People v. Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 858, 862,.331 P.2d 251, 254 (App.
Dep't Super. Ct. 1958) (general acceptance only required of those expected to be familiar with the
new technique); see also Hodo v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 778, 785-89, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547,
551-53 (1973) (relying on single expert to establish general acceptance); Commonwealth v. Lykus,
367 Mass. 191, 203, 327 N.E.2d 671, 678 (1975) (following Williamr in defining relevant scientific
community).
62. See Giannelli, supra note 23, at 1209-10.
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provide a court with a diverse pool of experts on PMS syndrome.6 3
Thus, a court could define the scientific community to include not only
experts with extensive first-hand knowledge about PMS syndrome, but
also to include enough other experts 64 to prevent the court from relying
on the opinions of a few isolated scientists.
Having defined the scientific community, a court must determine
precisely what Frye requires to be generally accepted. More specifi-
cally, the court must decide whether Frye requires general acceptance
of the theory underlying a new technique or principle or whether it
requires acceptance of only the technique or principle as applied.65 In
the context of PMS syndrome, the court must decide whether the de-
fendant must show that the cause of PMS syndrome as well as its po-
tential manifestations in an individual have been generally accepted.
Notwithstanding the optimistic statements of a few early commenta-
tors,6 a consensus is only now emerging on the cause of PMS syn-
drome. The most up-to-date research identifies PMS syndrome as the
result of a neuroendocrine disorder.67 Recently, however, two re-
searchers in the field, after reviewing all the pertinent literature, could
only conclude that, "(t]o date no one hypothesis has adequately ex-
plained the constellation of symptoms composing. . PMS. ''68
In applying ihe Frye standard, however, a court should not focus
on whether there is agreement as to the cause of PMS syndrome. The
63. See, agw, Reid &Yen, supra note 1, at 97-104 (reviewing the literature on PMS syndrome
while proposing to redefine the pathophysiology of PMS syndrome).
64. This group would forseeably include gynecologists, psychologists, and psychiatrists famil-
iar with current developments concerning PMS syndrome even though these people might not
have extensive first-hand clinical experience with the syndrome.
65. Giannelli, su.pra note 23, at 1211. The National Research Council takes the position that
Frye requires "general acceptance" of both the underlying theory and the technique. NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, ON THE THEORY ANDr PRACTICE OF VOICE IDENTIFICATION 41 (1979).
Wright & Graham have stated that decisions applying Frye hinge on acceptance of the underlying
theory. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE, § 5168
(1978). Giannelli finds that courts have rarely considered the issue. See Giannelli, supra note 23,
at 1212. Put see Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 638 (D.C. 1979).
Some courts have approached general acceptance in a different manner. These courts focus
on the "reliability" of the new technique or principle. D'Arc v. D'Arc, 157 N.J. Super. 553, 385
A.2d 278 (1978); People v. Collins, 94 Misc. 2d 704, 405 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1978). This approach
bypasses the issue of general acceptance because the "reliability of a scientific technique could be
established notwithstanding its lack of general acceptance in the scientific community." Giannelli,
.upr note 23, at 1220.
66. See k3(ra note 72 and accompanying text.
67. Reid & Yen, .upra note 1, at 96-97.
68. Id at 97. The difficulty in identifying the cause of PMS syndrome is that, as with many
human disorders, an imponderable number of variables may contribute to its onset. For this
reason medical experts are often, to the consternation ofjudges and lawyers alike, unable to recite
with precise certainty the cause of a particular disease or ailment.
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important legal issue is whether there is "general acceptance" among
experts that PMS syndrome can impair mental function to a degree
sufficient to negate the specific state of mind required for certain
crimes. To require a defendant to establish that there is also "general
acceptance" of the cause of PMS would be unfairly burdensome. For
purposes of the Frye standard, therefore, a court should require only
that a proponent of expert testimony on PMS syndrome establish the
"general acceptance" of the scope and severity of the potential symp-
toms, and not the underlying cause of PMS syndrome.
Finally, the court must determine whether the relevant scientific
community, as defined by the court, generally accepts the claim that
PMS syndrome can impair mental function in a legal sense.69 To an-
swer this question a court may rely on more than the in-court testimony
of experts.70 In the past, courts have relied heavily on the scientific
writings of experts concerning the novel scientific evidence in issue.
71
1. The Insanity Defense. There is little evidence that PMS syn-
drome alone produces psychotic behavior (insanity) in females. 72 Re-
searchers who have examined the question have concluded that PMS
69. Courts have not decided what percentage of experts must accept the novel scientific evi-
dence as accurate; instead, the courts offer rather vague statements. One court, for example, stated
that "conclusiveness" is not required. United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 438 (6th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971). The Massachusetts Supreme Court stated that the "Frye stan-
dard does not require unanimity of view, only general acceptance; a degree of scientific divergence
is inevitable." Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 204 n.6, 327 N.E.2d 671, 678 n.6 (1975).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has required a "widely" shared view. State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d
764, 768 (Minn. 1980).
70. See, eg., Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 380, 391 A.2d 364, 367 (1978).
71. See Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 204, 327 N.E.2d 671, 678 (1975); People v.
Rogers, 86 Misc. 2d 868, 873,385 N.Y.S.2d 228, 232 (Sup. CL 1976); see also Giannelli, supra note
23, at 1217-18.
A court might also rely on past court decisions to aid in ascertaining whether general accept-
ance exists. In the case of PMS syndrome this avenue of inquiry would be profitless: no court to
date has issued an opinion on the matter.
72. Oleck, an early commentator, contended that a PMS syndrome induced temporary in-
sanity could be proved by objective scientific tests. Oleck asserted that PMS syndrome is closely
linked to periodic episodes of hypoglycemia and can therefore be identified by a simple laboratory
test. Oleck, supra note 7, at 494. See also Stewart, Psychotic Aspects of Premenstrual Tension, 6
CLEV.-MAiL L. REv. 410 (1957), in which the author, then a student at the same school as Oleck,
made a similar argument. Both Oleck and Stewart took a rather crusading attitude towards estab-
lishing PMS syndrome as a "legal fact." Stewart, however, whose article appeared four years after
Oleck's, was no longer able to state categorically that the presence of PMS syndrome could be
proved before or after the event Stewart, however, did state that:
[t]hose entrusted with administering justice must be extremely prudent in accepting
novel principles which the test of time may prove to be incorrect. Conversely the law
must also battle the danger of being overcautious and impeding true progress .... It is
to be hoped that this innate conservatism of the legal profession will not prevent lawyers
from keeping open minds as to the acceptance of premenstrual tension as a legal fact.
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syndrome alone cannot cause recurrent cyclical psychosis. 73 In 1953,
for instance, one clinician, after noting that PMS syndrome often pro-
duces striking personality changes, commented that "singular symp-
toms [such] as evanescent psychotic episodes and epilepsy must be
carefully scrutinized and the patient regarded as having a more serious
illness than premenstrual tension."74 Another researcher, in 1957, after
reviewing the literature to date, concluded that the "concept of a men-
strual psychosis can now be abandoned. No convincing evidence has
been produced to show that such an entity exists."75 More recent find-
ings have not established a causal connection between PMS syndrome
and psychosis. 76 Thus, a temporary insanity defense based on PMS
syndrome is not likely to succeed.
2. The Diminished Capacity Defense. This is not to suggest,
however, that PMS syndrome is legally insignificant; it may be relevant
to prove diminished capacity. Many researchers have concluded that
PMS syndrome may, along with other factors, produce striking person-
ality changes in patients. One researcher states:
That the endocrine changes themselves may play a part in the causa-
tion of psychosis remains a possibility which has not been adequately
demonstrated. It is possible to conceive of a psychic disturbance
which results in interference with endocrine function. The latter
might then either perpetuate the original disturbance or cause
psychotic states.77
Another researcher concludes that PMS syndrome cannot be shown to
produce "temporary insanity," but suggests that it might be used to
And this is said with full awareness of the fact that clear medical proof of its exact nature
is yet to be established.
Id at 426-27. Oleck's view, however, has been discredited. More recent research has dismissed
the link between hypoglycemia and PMS syndrome. Reid & Yen, supra note 1, at 88. Hence it is
not possible to say, as Oleck did, that the link between temporary insanity and PMS syndrome
falls within the "area of provable fact." Oleck, supra note 7, at 492.
73. See Gregory, The Menstrual Cycle andIts Disorders in Psychiatric Patients, 2 J. OF PSY-
CHOSOMATIC RESEARCH 61, 75 (1957); Perr, supra note 1, at 217.
74. IsraeL, The Cl/'calPattern andEtiology of Premenstrual Tension, 166 INTL REC. OF MED.
469, 471 (1953).
75. Gregory, supra note 73, at 75.
A more recent report in the medical literature has documented psychosis in relation to the
menstrual cycle. The report pointed out, however, that the form of psychosis identified was not
related to PMS syndrome. "Two out of our seven cases showed the somatic symptoms of premen-
strual tension. ... But the psychosis in question here shows a different feature apparently from
premenstrual tension. We are dealing with mental illness aligned with the menstrual cycle and not
pre-menstrual tension associated with psychotic episodes." Endo, Daiguji, Asano, Yamashita &
Takahashi, Periodic Pychosir Recurring in Association with Menstrual Cycle, 39 J. CLIN. PSYCHIA-
TRY 456, 461 (1978).
76. Clare, 4 CURRENT MED. RESEARCH & OPINION 23-28 (1976).
77. Gregory, supra note 73, at 75.
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establish mitigating circumstances.' 8
More recent research by d'Orban and Dalton, two of the leading
experts in the field, has established that a statistically significant per-
centage of females who commit violent crimes do so during the
paramenstruum.79 PMS syndrome, therefore, may well influence the
actions of women who exhibit recurrent criminal behavior only during
their premenstrual or paramenstruum periods. They caution, however,
that "in interpreting the criminological significance of these findings, it
would be wrong to assume that women in general are more likely to
commit violent crime during certain phases of their menstrual cycle;
[instead, they postulate that] the psychological effects of menstruation
may act as a triggering factor to aggressive behavior in some women
who also show evidence of emotional instability at other times."'80 This
view is consistent with the findings of earlier researchers who con-
cluded that PMS syndrome alone does not produce psychotic
behavior.8'
Of greater significance is Dalton's documentation of the case histo-
ries of three women in England. Charged with the crimes of man-
slaughter, arson, and assault, respectively, each successfully pleaded
either diminished responsibility or mitigation, based on PMS syn-
drome.82 The behavior of these women was not psychotic. Dalton di-
agnosed each of them as suffering from PMS syndrome. She found
that each had histories of cyclically violent behavior related to men-
struation. All came from families with no history of criminal behavior.
None exhibited the somatic symptoms often associated with PMS syn-
drome. They all acted alone, and incarceration did not deter them
from further violent behavior. Dalton based her diagnosis entirely on
"the cyclical relationship of their crimes as recorded" in police and
78. Per, supra note 1, at 218.
79. d'Orban & Dalton, supra note 4; see also Dalton, Menstruation and Crime, 2 BRIT. MED.
J. 1752 (1961); Morton, Additon, Addison, Hunt & Sullivan, A Clinical Study of Premenstrual
Tension, 65 AM. J. OBSTET. AND GYNECOL. 1182 (1953).
These studies have not, however, established any precise causal connection between PMS
syndrome and crime. d'Orban & Dalton report that only two of the women in their study were
aware of any connection between their crimes and their menstrual cycle and that less than a
quarter exhibited somatic symptoms. This led d'Orban and Dalton to conclude:
[l]t appears that most women who commit violent crime during the paramenstruum do
not complain of subjective premenstrual tension symptoms and their only 'symptom'
may be an offence of violence or increased aggression during this period. Perhaps too
much emphasis has been placed on premenstrual tension symptoms as an aetiological
factor in female crime.
d'Orban & Dalton, supra note 4, at 358 (emphasis added).
80. d'Orban & Dalton, supra note 4, at 358.
81. See supra note 75 and text accompanying notes 73-76.
82. Cyclical CriminaActs, supra note 6, at 1071.
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prison records. Each woman was treated with natural progesterone
therapy, and each remained free of continued episodes of misbehavior
as long as she followed her treatment regimen.8 3 These three case stud-
ies lend some support to the hypothesis that PMS syndrome causes
criminal behavior in some women.
Dalton admonished, however, that "[w]e must remain suspicious
of women who plead that premenstrual syndrome is a reason for miti-
gation or diminished responsibility. '8 4 She pointed out that the etiol-
ogy of the syndrome is still unclear and that "good diagnostic proof is
still necessary."8' 5 In this regard, the following statement by Greene
and Dalton, made in 1957, is still valid:
Unfortunately, there is no test to assist the diagnosis of premenstrual
syndrome .... ITihe recognition of this syndrome must depend on
the intelligence of the patient, or her doctor. The only positive diag-
nosis of premenstrual syndrome can be made by recording on a cal-
ender the relationships of symptoms to menstruation.8 6
These studies and surveys constitute the literature on PMS syn-
drome as it directly relates to criminal behavior. The numerous studies
on the physical and psychological symptoms that occur with PMS syn-
drome8 7 have been limited in scope, usually correlating the incidence
of neuroses or affective disorders with PMS syndrome.38 No studies,
other than those cited, have attempted to find a causal connection be-
tween PMS syndrome and criminal behavior or have tried to evaluate,
from a legal perspective, the extent to which PMS syndrome might im-
pair mental function.
In summary, PMS syndrome by itself does not appear to produce
psychotic behavior that would support a plea of insanity. PMS syn-
drome may trigger or exacerbate underlying disorders, and it may be
related to cyclically recurrent criminal behavior, although it has not
been established whether it is the underlying cause of such behavior.
The research in the field, therefore, indicates that a claim of temporary
insanity induced by PMS syndrome would not satisfy the Frye "general
acceptance" standard.
83. Id
84. Id at 1071.
85. Id
86. Greene & Dalton, Discussion on the Fremenstrual Syndrome, 48 PaOc. ROYAL Soc'Y
MED: 337, 339 (1954).
87. See generally studies cited in Reid & Yen, supra note 1.
88. See, eg, Abramowitz, Baker, & Fleischer Onset of Depressive Psychiatric Crises and the
Menstrual Cycle, 139 AM. J. PSYCHtATRY 475 (1982). Blank, Goldstein, & Chattejie, Pre.Men.
strual Tension and Mood Change, 25 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 577 (1980); Golub, The Magnitude of
Pre.MenstrualAnxiety and Depression, 38 PsYCHOSMATIC MED. 4 (1976); Gregory, supra note 73.
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The research, however, does not address the precise issue of
whether PMS syndrome can impair mental function to such a degree
that a defendant could not form the specific state of mind required for
certain crimes. Dalton's research might support such a claim. What
other experts might testify to on that particular issue, however, cannot
be known. Thus, one cannot state categorically whether the Frye test
would require the admission or exclusion of expert testimony on PMS
syndrome offered to support a claim of diminished capacity.
IV. THE RELEVANCY APPROACH AND PMS SYNDROME
As discussed earlier, not all courts apply the Frye standard to
novel scientific evidence. Under Professor McCormick's8 9 approach,
expert testimony on novel scientific evidence such as PMS syndrome is
admissible when it is shown to be relevant, absent substantial other
reasons for exclusion.90
Evidence is relevant if it tends to make "the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence." 91 The McCor-
mick approach requires a balancing test: the greater the relevancy of
expert testimony on PMS syndrome, the less the chance it will be ex-
cluded for reasons such as prejudicing the jury. In the context of a
temporary insanity defense the relevance of expert testimony on PMS
syndrome would be low. There is little or no support for the view that
PMS syndrome can induce psychosis.92 Thus, even under the liberal
approach of McCormick such testimony should not be admitted when
offered to support a temporary insanity defense. In diminished respon-
sibility cases, however, the issue is whether the defendant was capable
of forming the specific state of mind required for the crime. Expert
testimony that the defendant suffered from PMS syndrome and thus
could not form the requisite state of mind would certainly be relevant.
The court would exclude the testimony only if it were shown that the
relevancy of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.93
89. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
90. Other reasons for exclusion include: "prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the
jury, or consideration of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence." FED. R. EvID. 403; see also McCoRMIcK, supra note 18, § 185.
91. United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685, 688 (D.D.C. 1979); FED. R. EvID. 401.
92. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
93. See FED. R. EViD. 403.
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Dalton's work suggests that expert testimony on PMS syndrome
would be relevant in the context of a diminished capacity defense.
Thus, under the McCormick approach the testimony should be admit-
ted unless the prejudicial effect of such testimony outweighs its proba-
tive value or if another reason for exclusion 94 is present. A court
should consider, for example, Dr. Dalton's admonition to "remain sus-
picious of women who plead that premenstrual syndrome is a reason
for mitigation or diminished responsibility. ' 95 A court should insist
that an expert seeking to testify about a particular defendant's disorder
possess clear diagnostic proof that the defendant suffers from PMS syn-
drome. The court should accept nothing less than medical, prison, or
other records indicating cyclically recurrent criminal, violent or other
behavior indicating mental impairment present only during the
premenstrual periods over an extended period of time. Absent such
evidence, expert testimony concerning a defendant's alleged suffering
from PMS syndrome would be likely to confuse or mislead the jury.
The probative value of such evidence would also be low. As a result,
the balancing test concerning the admissibility of evidence would dic-
tate the exclusion of such testimony.
V. CONCLUSION
As the debate concerning PMS syndrome has increased through-
out the United States, it is expected that a female defendant will seek to
use PMS syndrome as a defense to a criminal charge. This note has
sought to provide a framework within which a court might evaluate a
proffer of expert testimony on PMS syndrome in a criminal trial. Pri-
marily, the "general acceptance" standard as first articulated in Frye v.
United States has been relied on as a tool to assess the admissibility of
such testimony. Existing scientific literature appears to reject the possi-
bility that PMS syndrome could cause a type of temporary insanity.
The literature, however, does not conclusively indicate whether PMS
syndrome might impair mental function sufficiently to establish a de-
fense of diminished capacity. Thus, whether use of the Frye test will
admit or exclude expert testimony on PMS syndrome in the context of
a diminished capacity defense cannot be predicted. The less rigourous
balancing approach, however, would appear to require a court to admit
94. See supra note 90.
95. Cyclical CriminalActs, supra note 6, at 1071.
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expert testimony on PMS syndrome once it has been established that a
defendant did in fact suffer from this disorder.
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